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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Hey there little Red Riding Hood…. 
That Vladimir Putin has quite a sense of humor. When asked about the progress 
of reform, and the need for Russia to perform a serious overhaul of the structures 
of its economy and state institutions, President Putin agreed wholeheartedly: 
"This is most important and it will certainly meet with favorable response from our 
partners." (ITAR-TASS 1206 GMT, 13 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0813 via World 
News Connection) 
 
He also seemed aware of the failure of previous attempts at reform that were just 
cosmetic: "The wolf remained a wolf even in Grandma's disguise and swallowed 
Little Red Riding Hood after all," quipped Putin, who was noted by ITAR-TASS 
(Ibid.) as being "jovial" in that descriptive comment. (Now if Russia was the wolf, 
who do you suppose was Red? Moreover, his version of the story has an "FSB 
ending.") 
 
But reform really has been the talk of the town of late: getting serious about 
reform; undertaking profound reform projects; finishing with reform and getting 
back to work; and reforming the bodies assembled to oversee reform projects to 
make them more flexible to the needs of reform. It almost sounds like any other 
modern political bureaucracy. 
 
One of the major bureaucratic headaches of both the Yel'tsin and Putin regimes 
has been the task of administrative reform. The basic premise underlying the 
reform attempts is that corruption among state officials is too widespread, and 
there should be some clear manner of screening, monitoring, or investigating 
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officials at all levels in order to quash the graft that is siphoning resources from 
state coffers, allowing rampant 'shakedowns' by government employees (the 
police, for instance), creating a "protected" wealthy class of Oligarchs, and 
discouraging would-be dutiful tax-payers from fulfilling their obligations. 
 
One of the innovations of the Yel'tsin years was a proposal by the Chubais-
Nemtsov team to increase the salaries of state employees while insisting on a full 
disclosure of income and tax records by the civil servants. The plan worked in 
part, but many so-called reformers were caught in dubious 'cash transfer' 
schemes (advances on unwritten books and donations to non-existent 
foundations spring to mind), and forced to resign or at least weakened in the 
bureaucratic battles, thus enervating the administrative reformers. 
 
Putin has established a new commission to study, make recommendations on 
and eventually oversee his own brand of administrative reform. He lobbed the 
project over to the Government, Prime Minister Kasyanov, who then dropped the 
ball in Deputy Prime Minister Boris Aleshin's court, despite the history of attempts 
at administrative reform by other ministers and departments within the 
government. As one (clearly cynical) analyst noted: "A newly created superfluous 
structure will analyze superfluous functions." (Report by Yelena Lashkina, 
ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (RG) 13 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0813 via World 
News Connection) 
 
Aleshin convened the new reform commission to discuss the best approach to 
streamlining the burgeoning government structures. After a two hour discussion 
of the task at hand, it was decided: The issue of state reform was too complex for 
one commission, seven would be needed, each with its own Chief and staffs. 
The divisions of the new state reform group are as follows: Industry and Science, 
to be headed by Anton Danilov-Danilyan; the Natural Resources Utilization and 
Agriculture section, headed by Viktor Tolokonsky; the Energy, 
(Tele)Communications, Transport and Construction group, headed by Andrei 
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Sharonov; the Foreign Economic Activity sector overseen by Yevgeni Primakov; 
the group for Ensuring State Security by Vladislav Putilin; the Social Obligations, 
Health Care, Education, Sport and Information section headed by Aleksandr 
Pochinok, and the State Market Regulation group led by Anton Drozdov. [RG 
(Ibid)] 
 
There is some disappointment that no state group to Eliminate the Duplication of 
Peripheral Functions was established, but there are probably several similar 
groups at work already. 
 
For Sale: Presidential apt with panoramic views 
Those looking for a second home away in the mountains might consider a five 
room, fourth floor apartment in Yekaterinburg with views of a city pond and dam. 
The realtor's gem, listed with the local Atomstroikompleks agent, comes 
complete with a swimming pool, billiard room, private security, and oh yes, was 
also the former digs of the Yel'tsin family. The home is not as luxurious as one 
might expect of a presidential retreat since it dates from Boris Yel'tsin's days as a 
local Communist Party leader in the region, but it looks likely to fetch a fair 
farthing. Apparently souvenir-hungry Russians "of means" are no longer satisfied 
with flags or posters as remembrances from the Soviet days. The home of a 
former Soviet official now commands a significant price as the latest trend in 
nostalgia turns to real estate. (MOSCOW TIMES, 12 Aug 03 via Johnson's 
Russia List #7286 12 Aug 03) 
 
Dashing through the snow…. 
After dealing with new trends among Russia's monied class, it is perhaps only 
fair to consider the trends among the political/state elites. It seems a certain 
Sports and Equestrian Factory is being kept in business by the demand from 
politicians and their businessmen friends for horse-drawn carriages. 
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The factory is apparently capable of turning out a full line from the simple, yet 
elegant sleigh to a horse-drawn carriage with television and air conditioning; 
former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is said to have bought one, so has 
the former Kremlin Manager Pavel Borodin (allegedly for his boss, former 
President Yel'tsin). (FINANCIAL TIMES, 20 Feb 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis) Moscow Mayor Luzhkov may establish a special zone in the park for 
horse drawn carriages, and the Presidential Administration is said to be buying 
them in bulk. Better get them quick before the Administrative Reform 
Commission hears about this! 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Russia looks for a foothold in Southeast Asia 
On 4 August Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
— the first Russian head of state ever to visit that Southeast Asian country. 
Officially, the summit was to finalize arms purchases, sign agreements on 
communication and technology, and witness the initiation of the Russian-
Malaysian Business Forum. (BERNAMA NEWS AGENCY, 1 Aug 03; BBC 
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Even given the $900 million deal 
for 18 Russian-made Su-30MK fighter aircraft, Malaysia, two-thirds of which is 
covered by jungle, may seem like an out-of-the-way location for a visit from the 
President of the Russian Federation. Taking into account, however, the potential 
benefits for Russia in this part of Asia, it is clear that this two-day official visit was 
part of a calculated effort to continue and to enhance Russia’s decades old policy 
of seeking stronger influence in the region. 
 
The trip, which was originally scheduled for 8 July but postponed due to the 
bombing at the Moscow rock concert, comes just over a month after Putin’s 
Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, met in Moscow with another Southeast Asian 
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prime minister, Bounyang Vorachith of Laos. During those talks the Kremlin 
agreed to forgive 70% of the debt which Laos owes to Russia and to allow the 
remaining $380 million to be paid gradually and at a favorable interest rate over 
the next 33 years. (ENGLISH.PRAVDA.RU, 24 Jun 03) This, may seem odd 
considering the debt that Russia owes its own creditors. Laos, however, like 
Malaysia, is a useful foothold for Russia in the promisingly profitable region. 
 
The idea of Russian engagement in Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific region in 
general is not new. In the late 1980’s Russia established ties with the states of 
the Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) as part of President Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s revised Third World policies that emphasized relations with Asian 
countries of various economic stages of development. Former Russian Foreign 
Minister Yevgeni Primakov in 1996 also stressed the region as a priority of 
Russian foreign policy and in 1997 won acceptance for Russia into the Asian-
Pacific Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), despite indications that 
Russia did not meet the organization’s standards for membership. 
(ENGLISH.PRAVDA.RU, 23 Oct 02) 
 
There are many possible benefits for Russia to having a position of power and 
influence in the Far East; among them are potential profits from these military 
hardware and oil markets and, in some cases, useful business-like relations with 
elements of the Muslim world. As prospects for increased American and Chinese 
influences grow, the Kremlin has realized the necessity for stepping up its own 
activity there. 
 
Russia has made significant efforts already to strengthen relations between itself, 
India and China in an attempt not only to secure stability on the continent but 
also to counterbalance U.S. endeavors to increase influence in Asia. Moscow 
and Delhi have been conducting joint military exercises and a vigorous arms 
trade. Sino-Russian relations have also been dynamic in the diplomatic, 
economic and security arenas. In May 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao made 
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a state visit to Moscow where he and President Putin blessed a major oil deal 
between Russia’s Yukos and China's National Petroleum Corporation worth $150 
billion which envisions a pipeline to China to ship up to 700 million tons of oil 
from 2005 to 2030. Moreover, China has become the top customer for Russian 
arms sales, (ASIA TIMES, 3 June 03 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) #7208, 3 
Jun 03) with an overall level of trade between the two countries reaching $12 
billion in 2002. (RFE/RL, 26 May 03 via JRL #7196, 27 May 03) 
 
Russia and China also are working to counterbalance outside influences through 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which in its May 2003 summit set 
up a permanent secretariat in Beijing, appointed its first executive secretary and 
emphasized security measures through the establishment of its own anti-terrorist 
organization. (RUSSIAN CHANNEL ONE TV, 29 May 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) According to various international press sources, 
the organization may be considering expanding its membership. 
 
Stressing the importance of the bond between Russia, China and India, Russian 
Foreign Ministry spokesman A.V. Yakovenko announced that President Putin 
had met with his Chinese and Indian counterparts during the 57th Session of the 
UN General Assembly in New York (ITAR-TASS, 26 May 03; BBC Monitoring via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database), where they discussed the importance of mutual 
ties and cooperation between them for ensuring stability and security in Asia. The 
three countries reportedly have given strong signals that they would like to join 
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that is essentially a non-aggression 
treaty. (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESS (AFP), 18 June 03 via JRL #7227, 18 June 
03) Indeed, Russia has already engaged ASEAN in the security arena, as in April 
2002 when ASEAN and Kremlin officials met to discuss security in Southeast 
Asia; in June 2003 Russia signed a joint declaration with ASEAN for a 




China and India are certainly the major components of Russia’s plan for Asia, but 
Moscow is playing the entire field in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to its 
efforts with Laos, Malaysia and ASEAN, where Moscow is a "dialogue partner," 
Russia continues its business and diplomatic dealings with South Korea. In July 
2003 the Joint Russian—South Korean Intergovernmental Commission on 
Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation met in Seoul for its fifth annual 
meeting, the most significant results of which included South Korea’s expressed 
interest in new small energy projects in Siberia, access of South Korean 
automobile and automobile parts manufacturing to the Russian market, and final 
settlement of Soviet debts owed to South Korea. The agreement, which, in 
September 2003, will be finalized and signed by the respective finance ministers 
in Moscow, writes off $600 million of the $2.24 billion owed to Seoul and allows 
the remainder to be paid by 2025. (ITAR-TASS, 21 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0721 
via World News Connection) Indications of improved relations on a lower level 
include an information sharing agreement also reached at a separate meeting in 
July 2003 between Russian and South Korean maritime law enforcement 
agencies. (ITAR-TASS, 21 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0721 via World News 
Connection) 
 
Russia also has continued a working dialogue with Japan, although it gives 
Japan a noticeably lower priority than other Asia-Pacific countries. In June, 
Moscow dispatched Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko to Vladivostok to 
host Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi. In these discussions, Japan 
expressed interest in building an oil pipeline from eastern Siberia to the Asia-
Pacific region [(an idea not necessarily in Russia’s best interest given the more 
lucrative plan to build a pipeline to China), (REUTERS, 27 May 03 via JRL 
#7198, 27 May 03)] and in improving communication between Sakhalin and the 
Japanese islands; the two countries also signed a bilateral agreement under 
which Japan will help Russia to recycle its nuclear submarines. (RFE/RL Vol. 4, 
No. 26, 1 Jul 03). 
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The Russian Defense Ministry has also maintained communication with Japan. In 
April 2003, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov visited Japan to discuss possible joint 
military maneuvers. Then, in July 2003 General Yuri Yakubov, commander of the 
Russian Far Eastern Military District, followed up with a visit to his Japanese 
counterparts on the Japanese island of Sapporo where he and the commander of 
Japan’s Northern Army discussed further details of what would be historic joint 
ground and naval maneuvers. (ITAR-TASS, 16 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0716 via 
World News Connection) Indeed, the Japanese government has since 
announced that its self-defense forces will take part in joint exercises with the 
Russian Pacific Fleet in late August 2003. (ITAR-TASS, 8 Aug 03; BBC 
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Although Khristenko, in an interview following his talks in Vladivostok with the 
Japanese Foreign Minister, (ROSSISKAYA GAZETA, 15 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-0716 via World News Connection) played up a (previously resolved) 
decision to launch the next part of the Sakhalin-2 project, which involves a $4 
billion Japanese investment, it is clear that Russia’s relationship with Japan 
remains tainted by the continuing dispute over the Kuril Islands. Furthermore, 
considering Japan’s well established ties to the U.S., Russia may be less willing 
to expend energy on improving relations with Tokyo when it could be focusing on 
more fertile, profitable and susceptible territory elsewhere in the region. 
 
If Russia wants to be able to compete in this expanded "Great Game," it must 
focus on establishing its own role concerning the region’s stability. This may 
explain Moscow’s recent efforts to soothe the tensions on the Korean Peninsula, 
where the Kremlin may see the possibility of reasserting itself as a regional and 
global power by playing a leading role in ongoing negotiations. Indeed, Russia 
most recently has proposed that such talks be conducted in a four-sided forum 
(U.S., North Korea, Russia and China) or a six-sided one (with the inclusion of 
South Korea and Japan). (INTERFAX via the Wall Street Journal, 14 Aug 03) 
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Moreover, preventing conflict may also preclude an increase in U.S. military 
power and presence in the region. 
 
Russia lacks the military might to compete even with the current level of U.S. 
military presence and capabilities in the area, although it attempts to create the 
perception of a Russian military presence by means of its military cooperation 
with Japan and India, including a June 2003 deployment of a Russian naval task 
force to the Indian Ocean (RTR RUSSIA TV, 27 May 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database). However, Moscow's real strength consists of its 
arms export industry and its oil export. Russia would like to exploit its Muslim 
population to strike a chord. During his visit to Malaysia, President Putin, noting 
that Russia is home to over 20 million Muslims, announced his desire for Russia 
to become a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an 
organization of Muslim states that aims at protecting the interests of all the 
world’s Muslims. (RFE/RL, Vol. 4, No. 32, 12 Aug 03) If Russia were accepted, 
as a member it might give Moscow a competitive edge in the race for influence in 
the region, at least if its actions in Chechnya were overlooked. 
 
It remains to be seen however, if there is enough long-term support in Moscow to 
maintain such an Eurasianist foreign and economic policy approach or if the 
Atlanticist attitude will keep Russia's energy focused on becoming part of Europe 
and the West. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
And they're off... 
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The election campaign for the December parliamentary race is in full swing, and 
interestingly, it seems as though this year's politicians are taking their cues from 
days of yore. Advertisement on television, according to one expert, follows — 
uninspiringly — the program set by Boris Yel'tsin, while the real money remains 
on rumormongering. 
 
The popular tack is to downplay the politicians, and focus instead on voters in 
televised campaigns. Vladimir Yevstrafev, President of the Russian Association 
of Advertising Agencies, said he's seen it all before. "In the presidential campaign 
of the Yel'tsin years everything that involved direct and seemingly accidental 
appearances by ordinary people played brilliantly. In the current ad campaign all 
the parties are using 'ordinary people.' In the end they have merged into a single 
stream, as if all launched by the same person," he said. (IZVESTIA, 8 Aug 03 via 
Johnson's Russia List #7285) 
 
As for the rumors, they appear to indicate that Grigori Yavlinsky may be more of 
a political threat than many would have believed. An active campaign to convince 
voters that a YABLOKO without Yavlinsky is in the works does, indeed, manages 
to accomplish the exact opposite. While two newspapers reported the recent 
establishment of a movement to oust the YABLOKO leader , the coverage is 
more noticeable in what is missing — the names of any of the purported 
members of the political party seeking to be leaderless. 
 
Indeed, PRAVDA.RU (4 Aug 03 via Johnson's Russia List #7276) reported that 
the "party's followers both from Moscow and Russian regions expressed their 
support to the movement," but was unable to identify anyone other than Igor 
Morozov, who made the announcement, and his membership in the party is 
disputed by party officials. Further claims, meant to bolster the argument, also 
weaken it. According to one newspaper, Yavlinsky's ouster is sought due to 
allegations of "a financial-political conspiracy with the oligarchs, usurpation of 
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power within the party, and the populist nature of YABLOKO activities." 
(GAZETA, 5 Aug 03, via WPS Monitoring Agency, Johnson's Russia List #7277) 
 
Yet Gazeta's own coverage belies the points it tries to make: Igor Morozov, who 
announced the formation of the movement, refuses to comment on the 
movement's members (who could, one must note, move to another party if truly 
interested in staying in the liberal camp while separating from Yavlinsky). 
Yavlinsky certainly cannot be said to have usurped leadership of the party in 
recent days — he was a founding and eponymous member — and while the 
other co-founders have departed, with some analysts apportioning some blame 
for that onto Yavlinsky's autocratic shoulders, all that happened years ago. The 
dreaded connection with the oligarchs, conversely, simply serves notice that the 
much-reviled Boris Berezovsky might take advantage of the pressure on 
Yavlinsky and sneak into the Duma through this new movement. [In a 7 August 
television interview, Central Election Commission Chairman Aleksandr 
Veshnyakov noted that the oligarch could participate in the elections but must 
present his registration papers in person, at which point he likely would be 
arrested. Berezovsky has said that he would return to Moscow as soon as the 
prosecutor-general stops inviting him. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 11 Aug 03)] 
 
Paranoia, often with reason, remains a staple of Russian politics, and the folks at 
YABLOKO do not disappoint. The deputy head of the party, Sergei Mitrokhin, 
called the announcements of the movement "a banal black PR campaign." 
Morozov, Mitrokhin charged, has never been connected to YABLOKO, and is 
likely an "unprincipled quasi-political" individual working at the behest of Anatoli 
Chubais. (ROSBALT, 1 Aug 03 via www.eng.yabloko.ru) Moreover, the reported 
movement doesn't have any YABLOKO members, he said. (ROSBALT, 5 Aug 03 
via www.eng.yabloko.ru) The head of the party's Bashkortostan regional branch, 
Igor Rabinovich, looked elsewhere for the culprit, and said there was a long list of 
groups that might be interested in forming a Yavlinsky-less movement, including 
United Russia, the Communist Party and the presidential administration. 
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Unfortunately, most of these suppositions could be true; the motivation however, 
is questionable. It comes as no surprise that Yavlinsky is a less-than-collegial 
colleague at times. Much has been said about the danger facing the two liberal 
parties, YABLOKO and Union of Right Forces (SPS) particularly since they have 
proven incapable of cooperating in any sort of a coalition to obtain parliamentary 
seats. YABLOKO poses little threat to any of the parties listed as likely to be 
behind the "movement." The only political party that could possibly benefit from 
Yavlinsky's ouster, or even just rumors of a weakened leadership, would be SPS, 
to which worried YABLOKO-ists would turn, potentially guaranteeing that SPS 
would clear the five-percent vote hurdle for seats in the Duma. That could be 
motivation however, only for the naif who believes that Yavlinsky would 
disappear quietly from the political scene; if the folks at SPS know anything, it is 
that Yavlinsky will not go anywhere quietly. 
 
Nor does it make sense that the presidential administration is behind this. The 
democratic camp is small enough to be an annoyance, but too small to constitute 
a political threat to the presidential party, United Russia. If both YABLOKO and 
SPS manage to overcome the hurdle, their representation in the Duma still would 
be underwhelming. 
 
The Communist Party (KPRF) has its own problems at the moment, with yet 
another splinter appearing. According to KPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov, Duma 
Deputy Sergei Glazev decided to lead a nationalist-patriotic bloc with fellow MP 
Dmitri Rogozin, rather than run for the Duma on the Communist Party ticket. 
According to Novye izvestiya, Kremlin influences have been noted in the 
formation of that new bloc. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 11 Aug 03) This allegation 
makes more sense than similar charges concerning YABLOKO — the 
Communist Party does threaten the majority of United Russia, and a split in the 
communist nationalist forces would be beneficial to United Russia. 
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As to the YABLOKO situation, it could simply be a one-off attempt to see how 
easy it would be to dislodge Yavlinsky, in which case the rumors should die down 
before the September party congress. All should become clear then. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Maolmordha McGowan 
 
Mozdok attack 
At approximately 19:00 on Saturday August 1, a Kamaz truck was allowed to 
pass through the security checkpoints at the entrance to the Mozdok military 
hospital compound in North Ossetia. Seconds later the truck exploded, causing 
extensive damage to the hospital’s administrative building. According to the on-
site rescue teams, some 50 persons were killed by the blast, while more than 80 
received wounds of varying severity. (INTERFAX, 12 August 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-08012 via World News Connection) 
 
Fragments recovered by military investigators showed that the bomb contained 
Ammonium Nitrate–the same fertilizer used in the 1999 apartment bombings in 
Moscow. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 4 August 03 via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) The blast produced was equivalent to one ton of TNT. 
 
Speaking to the press after a meeting with his superior, Prosecutor General 
Vladimir Ustinov, Deputy Prosecutor Sergei Fridinsky stated that the installation 
at Mozdok had most likely been targeted due to its status as a first-line 
evacuation hospital. Servicemen wounded in Chechnya are typically sent to 
Mozdok for initial treatment prior to being transferred to other military hospitals. 
(ITAR-TASS, 3 August 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0803 via World News Connection) 
 
Who is to blame? 
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In the aftermath of the explosion, which marked the fourth suicide attack since 
May [12 May, 60 persons killed in Znamenskoye, Chechnya; 14 May, 18 persons 
killed in the Gudermes district; 5 June, 16 persons killed in a bus-bomb near 
Mozdok (ITAR-TASS, 2 August 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0803 via World News 
Connection)], President Vladimir Putin was cited by his press service as saying, 
"The negligence we observe, the negligence that makes (such) crimes possible, 
has gone beyond all acceptable boundaries." While it should be noted that Putin 
did not specifically attack the Security Services, other senior Russian figures 
were quick to point to failures on the part of both the FSB and the MVD. State 
Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznyov, speaking from St. Petersburg, claimed that 
the Secret Services were inefficient, and pointed out that "It might have been a 
rush decision to transfer the guidance of the anti-terror operation in Chechnya 
from its former supervisor, the FSB, to the interior ministry." (INTERFAX, 1 
August 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0801 via World News Connection). This "transfer" 
was mainly cosmetic, since the Interior Ministry is believed now to be controlled 
largely by the FSB. 
 
Former FSB boss Sergei Stepashin was even more pointed in his remarks, 
questioning why the Mozdok attack had not been stopped: "Why did 
representatives of the prosecutor’s office say right after the Mozdok bombing that 
they had known how it was organized?" (WPS-RUSSIAN POLITICAL MONITOR, 
6 August 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) It would seem that Stepashin’s 
question is a pertinent one, given Minister for Chechen Affairs Stanislav Ilyasov’s 
assertion that the "Secret Services know these people by name. These are the 
same people who engineered the crimes in Moscow, Grozny and other Russian 
cities." (ITAR-TASS, 3 Aug 03 FBIS-SOV-2003-0803 via World News 
Connection) 
 
Despite all these statements and allegations, it is highly unlikely that the FSB will 
in fact take any blame for this latest terrorist incident. No one close to President 
Putin has indicated that the FSB will be investigated for what is, at best, criminal 
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negligence to prepare for, and prevent terrorist strikes. Instead a convenient fall 
guy will, of necessity, be found: the "culprit" in fact has already been unveiled. Lt. 
Colonel Artur Arakelyan, the commander of the Mozdok compound has been 
placed under arrest. He has been charged with criminal negligence and failure to 
carry out orders. Arakelyan had been in his post less than a month when the 
attack occurred. Hospital employees and local residents interviewed by Vremya 
MN’s correspondent spoke out in defense of Arakelyan: "They are making a 
scapegoat out of him," commented one of the nurses. "Once again, they will put 
those who are not guilty in jail, and the criminals will walk free," said a local 
resident. 
 
The question remains to be asked whether the FSB is incompetent, negligent, or 
whether there is something more sinister at work: Is it politically expedient for 
Putin to allow some acts of terrorism to take place, in order to be able to claim, 




Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Kris Beasly 
 
Big plans, no money 
In recent weeks, senior Russian Air Force officers have presented their plans for 
the future development of their service, but as has been the case for a number of 
years, lack of funding will continue to limit their ability to carry out those plans. 
Indeed, this deficit causes consistent problems, such as poor maintenance, 
insufficient training, operation and support infrastructure, all of which reduce 




On 8 Aug 03, Air Force Commander Colonel-General Vladimir Mikhailov 
addressed the press before the 6th Moscow Aviation and Space Show (MAKS-
2003), and on 12 Aug 03 (Air Force Day in Russia) he briefed President Vladimir 
Putin on the current state of the Russian Air Force and its future plans. Mikhailov 
said the Air Force is working on three upgraded fighters: the MiG-29SMT (which 
they will begin fielding in 2004), the Su-27SN fighter, and an upgraded MiG-31. 
He also discussed the Yak-130 trainer/light attack aircraft (a likely Su-25 
replacement), the new Il-112V cargo aircraft (recently selected to replace both 
the An-26 and An-24 in the heavy lift role), and the upgraded Il-76MN medium 
airlifter. 
 
According to Mikhailov, the Air Force will concentrate on new "army support" 
aircraft such as a light transport aircraft and utility and attack helicopters in the 
next few years. In fact, Mikhailov’s deputy, Major General Dmitri Morozov, said 
the Air Force also would receive 50 new Mi-28 helicopter gunships over the next 
seven years. In the air defense arena, the Air Force is ready to field a new long-
range air defense system, the S-400, in 2004. Finally, the Air Force Chief 
discussed the upgrade work in progress on the remaining 15 Tu-160 strategic 
(i.e. nuclear) bombers being done at the Gorbunov Kazan plant. (ITAR-TASS, 12 
Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0812 via World News Connection and AP & MOSCOW 
TIMES, 11 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis) In fact, he was so enthusiastic about the 
upgraded bomber, he announced one would be included in the major exercise 
starting this month in the Far East (GAZETA.RU, 8 Aug 03; What the Papers Say 
via Lexis-Nexis). 
 
Of course, all of these modernization programs have dragged on for years 
because of the military's funding deficit. The Air Force has purchased very few 
new airframes since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, despite repeated 
announcements of intentions to do so, and it seems unlikely the government will 
soon be able to fund any such plans. (AP & MOSCOW TIMES, 11 Aug 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis) But, let us not forget, Russia has a double purpose for all of this 
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design, engineering and manufacturing work: preparing for the possibility that 
money will be found to purchase some of these aircraft for itself and continuing to 
leverage the remains of the mighty Soviet industrial complex for foreign sales. As 
Mikhailov himself continues to emphasize "…the upgrading of aircraft keeps 
Russian aircraft-building facilities busy [sic] maintains them for developing aircraft 
of the fifth generation." (ITAR-TASS, 12 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0812 via World 
News Connection). It is these foreign sales that provide much needed hard 
currency as well as political and military influence around the world (NIS 
Observed, Volume VII Number 14, 11 Sep 02) 
 
While President Putin expressed support for the Air Force and its plans, he also 
challenged the Air Force to move into the future of warfare by asking it to think 
about "…rearming strategic aviation. It should carry not only powerful nuclear 
weapons but also powerful conventional charges." (INTERFAX, 12 Aug 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0812 via World News Connection) In other words, Putin is trying to 
prod the AF into, to use the current U.S. terminology, "transforming." It’s obvious 
that the President took notice of the way the U.S. fought in both Operations 
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, and wants to equip the Russian military 
with long-range strike aircraft equipped with conventional precision weapons, as 
the U.S. has today. Russia currently has no JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) 
type of cheap, autonomous, precision-guided munition, nor do any of its aircraft 
have the avionics to employ such weapons, nor are its forces trained to employ 
the necessary tactics. "As far as high- precision weapons systems are 
concerned, the West has long since adopted the principle of "fire-and-forget." But 
Russian units need a laser beam trained at the target…The state arms 
procurement program specifies 80 kinds of shells for high-precision weapons 
systems. Not one of them has reached the troops yet." ("Can Russia Fight Iraq?" 
by Nikolai Poroskov in Vremya Novostei, 6 Feb 03 via WPS Monitoring Agency 




The main challenge faced by the Russian Air Force is a severe lack of funding, 
which would support flying hours to keep its aviators current, new or upgraded 
equipment and give its people decent pay and facilities. "Like the army and navy, 
Russia's air force has suffered from underfunding, poor training and low morale 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union." (AFP, 12 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
General Mikhailov said Russian aviators are getting less than 40 hours a year 
flying time for experienced pilots and between 60 and 80 hours for younger 
crewmembers, while the goal is 80-100 hours per year. (ITAR-TASS, 11 Aug 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0811 via World News Connection) By comparison, in Western 
militaries, several hundred hours a year is the norm. This lack of training comes 
with a heavy price in lives and equipment lost. For example, General Mikhailov 
attributed the recent crash of a Su-24 jet, in which both crewmembers died, to 
pilot error due to lack of proficiency in flying at night and in bad weather. 
Ironically, the crash, in a remote mountain forest in the Chita Region of Siberia, 
came during a training flight. (ITAR-TASS, 8 Aug 03 and INTERFAX, 8 Aug 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0808 via World News Connection). 
 
It is interesting to note that at the same time he’s citing poor training as a major 
problem for his Air Force, Mikhailov is setting in motion plans to train a number of 
Malaysian military pilots in Russia over the next few years to fly the 18 Su-
30MKM fighters for which Malaysia signed a contract in May 2003. The $900M 
deal is a huge boon to Russia and its military industrial complex, but one has to 
wonder if the Malaysians will get better training than Russia’s own pilots? (ITAR-
TASS, 4 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0804 via World News Connection). 
 
While precision-guided munitions and quality training are much less of a problem 
for the U.S. and other western Air Forces, the lack of funding to replace aging 
equipment is a problem all share. The lack of new airframes produces two 
consequent problems: lower combat capability and higher maintenance costs 
due to an aging fleet. The Russian Air Force may be forced to reduce its fleet by 
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about 50% in the next eight years unless more funding is found to upgrade and 
replace planes. According to a source at the AF weapons department, "Our 
experts estimated that by 2011, the Air Force's fleet may be slashed by more 
than half unless the necessary funds are allocated to modernize and repair it." 
The same source said that at least 40% of the aircraft are over 20 years old while 
only 1% of the planes and helicopters are younger than five years old. 
(INTERFAX, 30 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0730 via World News Connection). The 
US Air Force is facing some of the same concerns. In March 2003, General 
"Doc" Foglesong, Vice Chief of Staff, expressed concerns about "maintaining an 
ever-aging fleet of aircraft" to members of the House Armed Services Committee 
subcommittee on readiness. (USAF Print News, 19 Mar 03 via AFLINK website) 
On 25 Feb 03, USAF Chief of Staff, Gen. John Jumper told the U.S. Senate that 
a major stress on his service is the cost of maintaining an increasingly dated 
fleet. According to Jumper, "Our average aircraft is 23 years old -- the oldest 
we've ever had to deal with. We're facing corrosion and fatigue problems we've 
never seen before." The AF reports that the cost of maintaining the fleet is 
increasing at about 10 percent per year. (USAF Print News, 25 Feb 03 via 
AFLINK website) 
 
The lack of money has produced operational concerns as well. General Mikhailov 
said that his service is no longer able to provide positive air traffic control over 
portions of Russia, especially the northern border area. "Today, on-duty radars 
cover mainly the western and southern borders of Russia, while in the north and 
internal regions of the country it ... covers only 35 percent of the territory. The 
problem is there and is complicated, but it could be resolved," he said. The 
unspoken, but obvious conclusion that he intended to convey is that money is the 
answer yet again. (AP & MOSCOW TIMES, 11 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Current success 
Despite the major funding issues however, Russia is having some success in 
forward deploying her Air Force. After months of discussions, it looks like the 
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Russian AF will soon be stationing Sukhoi’s and MiGs at Kant, Kyrgyzstan. As its 
share of the force, Kyrgyzstan will provide four L-39 trainers, as well as rescue 
helicopters. (ITAR-TASS, 11 Aug 03, 1016 GMT; FBIS-SOV-2003-0811 via 
World News Connection) General Mikhailov, during a recent visit to Kant, said 
that Russia planned to station several fighters and 400-500 servicemen there 
permanently as part of a new rapid deployment force, although he left open the 
possibility that the final numbers might change. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 




Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadezda Kinsky 
 
UKRAINE 
End of the road - again 
The Gongadze murder investigation suffered another serious setback on August 
1, when a key suspect died while in custody. The Ukrainian Institute for Mass 
Information (IMI) reported that Ihor Honcharov died in an ambulance on the way 
from jail to the hospital — it is still unclear why he required hospitalization, 
however. Honcharov is a former policeman who was implicated as one of the 
major suspects in the murder of the journalist Gongadze in 1999. The case has 
still not been resolved and is being watched by organizations and politicians 
inside and outside Ukraine for progress towards a solution. The beheaded 
corpse of Heorhiy Gongadze was positively identified just this year and finally 
buried by his mother and girlfriend. They are both deeply committed to trying to 
move the investigation forward and are being supported by watchdog 
organizations like Reporters without Borders. The government has been accused 
repeatedly of blocking the investigation, which continues to flounder. 
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Honcharov was due to give evidence for the Prosecutor-General Svyatoslav 
Piskun later this month. Last year, thirteen suspects were named in the case, all 
allegedly members in a gang led by Honcharov. The thirteen suspects and 
Honcharov were all police and intelligence officers, a fact which, along with the 
Melnychenko tapes, implicating President Kuchma, are the major grounds for the 
accusation that Kuchma and the government had a hand in the crime (an 
accusation they consistently deny). 
 
Honcharov was the lynch pin in the investigation, and there is suspicion in 
Ukraine that he was killed deliberately before he could give embarrassing 
evidence. Honcharov's death was announced officially on August 5 by Interfax, 
but his body had already been cremated on August 3; a highly suspicious, albeit 
obvious, means of destroying possible evidence. 
 
IMI has stated that it had received a letter from Honcharov before his death. The 
letter, the authenticity of which has not been verified by IMI, was passed to the 
institution with the instruction that it only be opened in the event of Honcharov's 
death; states that he had evidence on the murder of Gongadze — even an audio 
recording and a confession by the murderer. The letter does not reveal the 
location of this evidence, because the author did not trust the prosecutor-
general's office and would only give this evidence in court with journalists as 
witnesses. (Zerkalo Nedeli, 9 Aug 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) It was 
reprinted in Ukrainian on August 7 on the Ukrayinska Pravda website 
(www.pravda.com.ua). 
 
The death of Ihor Honcharov shortly before his hearing is just the latest outrage 
in the investigation of the murder of Heorhiy Gongadze. The growing suspicion of 
a cover-up and the concern that the truth will never "out" in this case, continues 
to discredit the Ukrainian government and erode any trust in its integrity. 
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In the meantime, journalists remain under attack in Ukraine. This year alone, two 
journalists were killed in suspicious circumstances, and many investigations from 
past assaults on the media are still open without hope of resolution. The latest 
case to raise international attention was the July 24 attack on Oleg Eltsov, who 
required hospitalization after an encounter with unknown attackers. The 
International Federation of Journalists (www.ifj.org; 28 Jul 2003) has demanded 
that the Ukrainian government immediately investigate this case to determine if it 
is connected to his professional work. 
 
BELARUS 
School's out - forever? 
The pupils of an entire school in Minsk do not know where they are going to 
attend their lessons after summer break, if at all. The National Humanities 
Lyceum, a private school and the last one in Belarus to teach all subjects in the 
Belarussian language, was closed by the governmental education authority late 
in June. The official reason for the closure was that the building needed 
renovation, but pupils, parents and teachers have been unwilling to accept this 
decision. They have since been protesting and several pupils threatened not to 
attend school at all if they could not attend the Lyceum once school begins again 
in September. The protestors have targeted both the education authority 
headquarters and the school. By protesting in front of the school since early 
August, parents and pupils have prevented the purported renovations from taking 
place. The protestors do not believe that there really is a renovation plan, fearing 
instead that the construction project is only aimed at keeping the school closed 
through September and beyond; according to the education authority, the 
building will remain closed for at least 2 years for the renovations to be 
completed. 
 
"The authorities are faking renovation to prevent the class from starting school on 
1 September," school founder Vladimir Kolas said. (BELAPAN, 7 Aug 03; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) Apparently, the teachers, parents and pupils had 
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heard from one of the builders that there was no plan for the works or any real 
renovation on the building. A two-year stretch without instruction would be the 
death of the school, since its pupils would have to switch to new schools in the 
meantime and would probably not return, at least not in the same numbers. 
 
The protests have grown as the summer went on and have been approaching a 
more vociferous peak since late July. Those connected to the school are aware it 
poses a considerable ideological threat to the government and is not under close 
governmental control. Opposition politicians, for example, tend to send their 
children to this school. Even the sheer fact that it teaches only in the Belarussian 
language signals a line of opposition to Lukashenka's course. A new school to 
replace the old one — a suggested name has been Minsk State Humanities 
Lyceum — would probably be organized in such a manner that it would more 
easily controlled by the government. The school's defenders have appealed to 
international and Belarussian NGO's and similar organizations. One main 
defender of the Lyceum has been the Belarussian civic initiative Charter 97, one 
of the most important voices of the Belarussian opposition. (www.charter97.org) 
This organization defends the establishment of a strong civil society and has 
placed the blame for the closure squarely on Lukashenka's shoulders. They have 
shown themselves particularly concerned about the need for a stable and open 
education, without which a democratic base cannot be built in the country. 
Indeed, it is a serious concern how much Lukashenka's increasing ideological 
control of the country — in the form of domination over political, media as well as 
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The Bandit Doctor's Book 
The appearance of Khassan Baiev's, The Oath: A Surgeon Under Fire, is a 
momentous occasion, a first hand account of life in war time Chechnya. Baiev's 
life is a window into contemporary Chechen history. As a young man he takes us 
into the mountains to show us his ancestral village and tells us about the 
deportations, a painful memory that would inspire the quest for Chechen 
independence. Then comes medical school, a romance with a Russian girl, and 
his Hippocratic oath -- to provide treatment to everyone who requires it. Baiev's 
commitment to his oath is tested in two wars. 
 
This book tells the story of the wars as experienced by a Chechen surgeon. The 
political struggles are in the background; in the foreground are the victims and 
their wounds— amputations, billowing entrails, the stench of pus and rotting flesh 
and dry blood, horribly deformed babies, and mother's milk running dry. What we 
have is an honest Chechen voice telling us about hell in beautifully crafted 
English prose. 
 
To be sure, Dr. Baiev had more than a little help from journalists Ruth and 
Nicholas Daniloff. Speaking among friends, Baiev shared his struggles and 
weaknesses in ways that are alien to a traditional culture. The successful 
surgeon and judo champion was awkward around girls and had trouble finding a 
bride. During the war he was too busy for introspection. He treated dozens of 
patients in a day, sawing off limbs until his saw became blunt, using ordinary 
thread after the surgical supply ran out. But after the war, while on a medical 
fellowship in Moscow, he suffered a breakdown and admitted himself for 
psychiatric treatment. We hear about the anxieties, the sadness, and the panic 
attacks that plagued him. 
 
For those who are new to the subject of the Chechen war, Baiev is a most 
trustworthy guide. Providing brief insights into Chechen religion, culture, and 
history, he never tries to explain, much less rationalize, things that westerners 
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may not understand. He tells us what he did, saw, and felt, omitting the politics 
and ideology. The only time that Baiev picks up a weapon is to stop a suitor who 
would kidnap his sister. Yet on the next page, he helps a friend to abduct a bride. 
When foreign wahhabis appear in Chechnya after the first war, to propagate an 
alien form of Islam and instruct Chechens that women should be veiled, Baiev 
was outraged, "for four hundred years we have fought against people telling us 
what to do." Why would Chechens require religious instruction from abroad, 
when Baiev's own father had risked eight to ten years of jail by secretly 
instructing youth in the Koran. 
 
For the specialist, there are details that expand the existing record. Baiev's 
account shows clearly that civilians are the main victims of the war and he is an 
expert witness to grave war crimes — Russian planes bombing hospitals; 
Russian planes bombing civilians as they try to flee along a highway out of 
Grozny; signs of torture on victims' bodies; wounds and birth defects which 
suggest radioactivity or other types of toxins, and wounds from prohibited 
weaponry including fuel-air bombs. 
 
During the second war, when Baiev worked in a makeshift hospital in a Grozny 
suburb Alkhan Kala he became a witness to the pivotal event of the war — the 
exodus of Chechen fighters from Grozny. The first to abandon the city along this 
route were the infamous criminal Arbi Baraev and his thugs. They left on January 
5, 2000 and escaped Alkhan Kala as the federals took the town. Corroboration of 
the rumored federal protection of Baraev is seen in the fact the Russian soldiers 
refused to chase Baraev, even as Alkhan Kala natives told them where he had 
gone. On January 31, thousands of Chechen fighters left the city, but they, unlike 
the Baraev gang, ran into a minefield. Hundreds of wounded fighters, including 
the infamous commander Shamil Basaev wound up on Baiev's table. Having 
amputated Basaev's foot and provided treatment for many other fighters, Baiev 
became an enemy in Russia's eyes. Pictures of him were plastered at 
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checkpoints, on television he was denounced as the "bandit doctor." This 
prompted his emigration to the United States. 
 
One of the characteristics of a captive nation is that its history is written by 
outsiders, foreigners who happened to pass through. For a variety of reasons, 
pertaining to both the history of foreign subjugation and the turmoil of the last ten 
years, the current generation of Chechen scholars, journalists, and politicians -- 
who under other circumstances would be engaged in this effort -- have neither 
the material nor emotional resources to grapple with the tragic recent history of 
the Chechens. Perhaps, in this last paragraph of my last NIS Observed, I can 
address those Chechens who are even now engaged in a personal struggle to 
write a painful history and suggest to them this book as a potential source of 
support and inspiration. To paraphrase William Faulkner, history is not merely the 
record of man, but one of the props that helps him endure and prevail. 
 
The Oath: A Surgeon Under Fire 
Khassan Baiev with Ruth and Nicholas Daniloff 





Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Joel Hafvenstein 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Economic ties with Russia, military ties with America 
On August 6, Vladimir Putin paid a whirlwind visit to Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov 
in the city of Samarkand. Of all the Central Asian presidents, Karimov has been 
most committed to bringing his country out from Russia’s shadow. Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan are too weak to resist Russian military aid and airbases; Kazakhstan 
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accepts Russia as the regional hegemon and is trying to forge a cooperative 
relationship; and Turkmenistan’s president, concerned with dominating and 
isolating his own people, only bucks Russia’s will when necessary for his 
attempts to construct a hermit state. Uzbekistan, however, has pointedly rejected 
most of Moscow's efforts to restore Russian domination over its former empire. 
The most populous of the Central Asian republics, and the one with an economy 
least dependent on hydrocarbons or foreign aid, Uzbekistan sees itself as the 
region’s potential new hegemon. The economies of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Turkmenistan are currently highly dependent on Uzbek goodwill; Karimov’s 
decision to close a border or pipeline can have severe effects. Karimov also has 
an eye on Afghanistan, where one of his clients, Rashid Dostum, is a renowned 
regional warlord. 
 
Uzbekistan’s own gas and oil however, can only be exported through pipelines 
passing through Kazakhstan and Russia. This is the fulcrum of Russian leverage 
over Uzbekistan, and Putin highlighted "gas cooperation" as a key issue in the 
August 6 talks. (ITAR-TASS, 1213 GMT, 6 Aug 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0806 via 
World News Connection) Karimov has accepted that he must remain on excellent 
terms with the Russian gas company Gazprom. After meeting with Putin, the 
Uzbek President declared his interest "not only in Gazprom coming to our 
deposits," an issue negotiated in last year’s strategic cooperation agreement, 
"but also in Gazprom being the pipeline operator in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan." 
Gazprom is interested in blocking competitor Itera’s access to Turkmen gas (see 
NIS Observed, 30 Jul 03); if it gains operational control of the Central-Asia-
Center pipeline in Uzbekistan, it will have the power to ship all the gas 
Turkmenistan sells through Gazprom. Whether Karimov will be happy with 
Gazprom shipping large volumes of Turkmen gas through his country is another 
question. 
 
On other economic issues: Putin would like to integrate Uzbekistan into an 
economic bloc with the more populous former Soviet states. On August 6, he 
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tried convincing Karimov to enter the single economic zone that currently 
includes Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. He lamented the low volume 
of trade between Uzbekistan and Russia, and called for more openness to 
investment (which would benefit mostly Russia) and expedited trade of cotton 
(which would benefit mostly Uzbekistan). Karimov did not appear as yet to be 
swayed by Putin's salesmanship. 
 
On geopolitics: Karimov said he was convinced that "Russia is reviving and 
taking a place that befits it in the world." (ITAR-TASS, 1055 GMT, 6 Aug 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0806 via World News Connection) However, in regard to 
Central Asia, he recognized only that Russia had a legitimate interest in what 
went on along its southern border — a border which actually does not include 
Uzbekistan — and added, "I hope Russia also understands Uzbekistan's role in 
the region." 
 
The two presidents also discussed the efforts of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO, a regional conference including China) to build a 
counterterrorism force. On this issue, we can expect Karimov to give only limited 
support, despite the threats to his own regime from guerrilla groups like the now-
defunct Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. For a possible rationale behind this 
stance, we can look to another visitor Karimov entertained, one week after his 
brief summit with Putin: US Chief of Central Command John Abizaid. The two 
discussed the military state of affairs in Afghanistan at Khanabad Airbase, where 
1,500 U.S. troops have been stationed since October 2001. (IRIB News, 15 Aug 
03 via www.times.kg) The U.S. war on terror has provided the occasion for 
Uzbekistan to move out of Russia’s military sphere of influence. If the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan succeeds and the U.S. troop presence is 
diminished, Karimov will almost certainly try to convince the USA to retain forces 
at Khanabad for geopolitical reasons. Hence Karimov will pay lip service and give 
some support to the SCO counterterrorist force; but it cannot be allowed to 
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